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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
BANK OF AMERICAN FORK,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
G L CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, KAY L. JACOBS, CALVIN SWENSON, KEITH R. ANDERSON, ALVIN G. SCHOW, BANK OF
PLEASANT GROVE, A Utah corporation, STATE BANK OF LEHI,
a Utah corporation, JOHN DOE I,
JOHN DOE II, JOHN DOE III,
f OHN DOE IV, JOHN DOE V and
JOHN DOE VI,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.

12223

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action is a complaint stating two claims for relief. The first is an action for declaratory judgment to
determine whether the activities of G L Corporation constitute a violation of Section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated,
1953. The second claim requests injunctive relief restraining Defendants from operating a branch bank.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE
LOWER COURT
The lower Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the ground alleged therein that Plaintiff's Com-
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plaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can hP
granted.
REILIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment of Dismissal of the Lower Court and a J udt,11nent specifying
and declaring that the activities of Defendant G L Corporation set forth in its Complaint constitute a violation
of Section 7-3-G, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 and injunctive relief as prayed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is a Utah Corporation with its principal
place of business at American Fork, Utah. (R. 3) Defendant G L Corporation is a Utah corporation ·with its
principal place of business in the same city. (R. 3) The
latter corporation is organized and operated as a bank
service coqioration pursuant to the provisions of Section
7-3-32.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended and per.forms certain senicPs for the Bank of Pleasant Grove
and the State Bank of Lehi, including check sorting and
posting to individual accounts of the drawer, maker or
other persons to be charged. (R. 3) Defendant Bank of
Pleasant Grovl' is a Utah corporation with its principal
office in Pleasant Grove, Utah. (R. 4) Defendant State
Bank of Lehi is also a Utah corporation with its principal office located at Lehi, Utah. (R. 4) Th<! individual
Defendants are officers and directors of G L Corporation. (R. 4)
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Plaintiff has a present exclusive right to conduct
banking business in American Fork pursuant to a franchise granted to it by the State of Utah and no other unit
or branch bank has present authority to conduct such a
hanking business. (R. 4) The activities of Defendant
G L Corporation have wrongfully invaded the property
rights of Plaintiff and have caused Plaintiff irreparable
injury. (R. 4, 5) American Fork is a city of the third
class. (R. 4) The Bank of Pleasant Grove and the State
Bank of Lehi are not located within the corporate limits
of the City of American Fork. (R. 4)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT G L CORPORATION, IS FUNCTIONING
AS A BRANCH OF THE BANK OF PLEASANT GROVE AND
STATE BANK OF LEHI IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 7-3-6,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953.

Section 7-3-6 provides in pertinent part:
"The business of every bank shall be conducted
only at its banking house and every bank shall receive deposits and pay checks only at its banking house except as hereinafter provided. (Emphasis Supplied)

* * *

The term 'branch' as used in this act shall be
held to include any branch, branch office, branch
agency, additional office, or any branch place of
business at which deposits are received or check:>
paid or money lent."
"The statutory definition of the term 'branch' includes any place of business at which ... checks are paid
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.... clearly, then, to constitute a place of business a8 a
'branch bank' it is not necessary that a complete banking
operation be conducted. It is sufficient if only such limited banking functions are perfonned." Fin;·t National
Bank of J,ogtNl v. Walker Bank aHd Trust Company, 19
n. 2d, 18, 21; -±25 P. 2d -±14, 16
As the payment of chPcks constitutes branch banking a preliminary question which must be ascertained before determining whether Defendant G L Corporation's
operation constitutes a violation of Section 7-3-6 is simply whether said Defendant pays checks for the Bank of
Pleasant Ornve and the State Bank of Lehi. In this regard Sedion 70A-±-213, U.C.A. 1953 defines what is
meant
final payment of an item by a payor Bank as
follows:
"(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank
when the bank has done any of the following,
whichever happens first:

* * *

( c) completed the process of posting the item
to the indicated account of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith.
It is not disputed that Defendant G L Corporation
performs the activity of final posting to the accounts of
drawers, makers or other persons to be charged for its
principals, the Bank of Pleasant Grove and the State
Bank of Lc,hi. Plaintiff subrnit's that ::;nch activity under
the terms of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code constitutes tlw payment of checks. See, Western Ba11k v .
.:lf arinc N a6mrnl E:-rchange Bank, (Wisc.) ] 55 NvV 2d
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587; When is a Check Finally Paid?, 85 BANKING
P. 82:3

L,i. W

The question of whether certain bank services, performed outside the physical location of the principal
banking house of a bank constitute branch banking has
been raised in at least four principal cases. The first of
is the case Jackson v. First National Bank of Cor11elin (Ga.) 292 F. Supp 156.
In that case, Plaintiff, as Superintendent of Banks
of the State of Georgia, sued the Defendant seeking to
prohibit the operation of an armored car messenger
service. Defendant transmitted funds to and from its
hank, made change and provided teller service of payroll
cashing outside of its banking house.

The service which was so conducted was established
and authorized under a ruling by the Federal Comptroller of the Currency and was carried on in the manner
provided by regulations of the Comptroller.
The Federal Court, relying on the Utah Walker
Bank case (385 U.S. 252), first stated that it was bound
by the state of definition of branch banking. The Court
determined that Georgia's statutes defined a branch as
''any additional place of business of any parent bank not
lo<·ated within the particular city ... where its parent
bank was chartered." Georgia law also provided: "No
hank shall carry on or conduct or do a banking business
in this state <'xce1)t on the premises of the place of busitH•ss (banking house) established and operated under
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and pursuant to a permit from the Superintendent of
Banks ... "
'l'hl· Conrt held that under the facts of the casP thP

operation of the armored car messenger service, as described above, constituted the establishment of a bank in
violation of (JL>orgia law and authorized an injunction
prohibiting further operations.
The case of Dickenson v. First National Bank in
Plant City, Floridci, 400 F. :2d 458, also discusses applicable Florida law. In the principal case, the Defendant
was the Comptroller of the State of Florida, who was
by the Plaintiff bank for declaratory judgment seeking to determine that its shopping center receptacles and
armored car service did not constitute branch banking in
violation of Florida state statutes. Both services were
authorized and rPgulated by the Federal Comptroller of
the Currency. In addition, the bank had put upon its deposit slips the notation "the transmittal of said currency
... shall not be deemed to be a deposit until delivered into the hands of the bank's tellers at the said banking
house/'
The Court cited the case of Jacks·on v. First National
Bank of Valdosta, 349 F. 2d 71 (Ga.) where the definition
of branch was ". . . any branch bank, branch office .. ·
additional office ... at which deposits are received, or
checks paid, or money lent." In the Valdosta case, it was
held that a proposed drive-in facility was an illegal
hranch bPcause it cashed checks and the Court cited its
prior opinion in great detail.
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Jn rPliance nvon the \T aldosta case, and the Florida
statute permitting "only one place of business" for a
hank, the activities of the bank were held prohibited by
Florida law.

The Utah case of Continental Bank & Trust Compan:i; r. Tuylor, 1-± Ut. 2d 370, 384 Pac. 2d 79(i, is also contrnJ!ing in principle. In that ca:-;e, the Plaintiff bank filed
an action for a declaratory judgment seeking to determine that Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, did not prohibit
certain practices in regard to making automobile loans
through insnrance agents. '1 he facts disclosed that tlw
bank had established a course of dealing with various
insurance agents under which the bank furnished them
'" ith forms of checks, promissory notes and advertising
matter, advertising the bank as "your one stop automobile insurance and financing center." Insurance agents,
either at their offices or homes, obtained from customers
credit statements, and pertiiwnt information about the
antomoihle to he purchased, which was forwarded to the
hank. At the bank, tlw information was entered on a
credit application form; the bank then notified the agent
by telephone of its determination; the agent filled out
blanks on appropriate forms and the purchase \Yas consummated.
1

Tlw Utah Conrt qnoted Section 7-3-6 in its entirety
nnd determined that the insurance agents were, in fact,
agent:-; of the bank in conducting its business. It quoted
American Law Institute Restatement of Agency as
follows: "Agency is the fiduciary relation which results
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from the manifestation of cuu::;ent by one vernon to another that the other shall act on his bPliaH and subject to
his control, and consent by the other to so act."
The Court found that there was a manisfestation of
consent by the bank to the insurance agents that said
agent::; should act in a fiduciary n'latimrnhip 011 hehalf of
the bank for the purposes heretofore set forth. The
Court concluded by saying, "V\T e consider the language
of Section 7-3-ti, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, referring to
and defining the term 'branch' as meaning and including
any office or place of business where 'deposits are reteived or checks paid or money lent' by the bank. If such
office or place of business is established and conducted
by SPction 7-3-6, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, it is proper
and lawfnl. If such office or place of business is not so
established or conducted, then it is not proper and it
is not lawful."
In the present case, for the purpose of this preceeding it is dPenwd admitted by Defendant, G L Corporation, that it pays checks in American Fork for the Bank
of Pleasant Grove and State Bank of Lt>hi. As such,
this procedme is not established or authorized by Section
7-3-6 as the payrnent of checks is a function of a branch
bank.
Plaintiff submits that such a branch bank is not
proper nor is it lmYful and that the Lower Court should
not have granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
should have accorded Plaintiff injunctive relief in accordance with the prayer of its Complaint.
CONCLUSION
Beeause of the fact that the activities of Defendant
G L Corporation in paying checks for its principals con-

stitute branch hanking in violation of Section 7-3-6, Utah
Code Annotated, 1933, it would appear that the judgment
of the Lower Court is not in harmony
law. It should
Le reversed and a judgment by this Court entered to the
effect that the paying of checks under the facts of this
case constitutes branch banking and should be enjoined.
Respectfully submitted,
BETTILYON & HOWARD
F. Burton Howard
Attorneys for Appellant
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah

